Evidence was sufficient to establish the defendant's constructive possession of a gun because the defendant had access to the gun and had exercised control over the gun and there was evidence to corroborate the defendant's statement to police that the defendant had purchased a gun since the defendant knew where the gun was hidden and the defendant gave police permission to enter the room, indicating the intent to exert control over the room and contents. Fed. Senior v. State, 277 Ga. App. In the Interest of D. B., 341 Ga. App. 481, 657 S.E.2d 533 (2008), cert. 16-11-131. 474, 646 S.E.2d 695 (2007). 331, 631 S.E.2d 388 (2006). 604, 327 S.E.2d 566 (1985). Fact that weapon was acquired for self-defense or to prevent its use against defendant as defense in prosecution for violation of state statute prohibiting persons under indictment for, or convicted of, crime from acquiring, having, carrying, or using firearms or weapons, 39 A.L.R.4th 967. 16-11-131, the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on the definitions of constructive and joint possession to enable the jury to consider whether defendant "possessed" the weapon within the meaning of that section. 608, 722 S.E.2d 351 (2012). 901, 386 S.E.2d 39 (1989). .040 Possession of firearm by convicted felon -- Exceptions -- Applicability to youthful offenders. Defendant waived defendant's objection to the trial court's consideration of a particular conviction in aggravation of sentencing under the recidivist statute, O.C.G.A. Lee v. State, 280 Ga. 521, 630 S.E.2d 380 (2006). - When a defendant was charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, the defendant was entitled to a charge as to justification, the only defense defendant claimed; the refusal to so charge and to charge merely the language of O.C.G.A.
Springfield, Illinois, Man Convicted of Possession of Firearm by a Johnson v. State, 279 Ga. App. Ledesma v. State, 251 Ga. 487, 306 S.E.2d 629 (1983), cert. 15, 443 S.E.2d 662 (1994); Willis v. State, 214 Ga. App. denied, No. Evidence that handguns belonging to a passenger in a defendant's car, that the handguns were within an arm's reach of the defendant during the commission of felony drug offenses, that the defendant knew that the passenger carried guns for protection while in the drug trade in which the defendant actively participated, and that the defendant was a first offender probationer was sufficient to show that the defendant jointly and constructively possessed the handguns in violation of O.C.G.A. - Because defendant was found guilty of malice murder, defendant was properly convicted also of a possession count, it being unrelated to malice murder. 86-4. - Conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon could not stand because the same prior conviction could not support both recidivist sentencing and a conviction of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and also a nolo contendere plea could not serve as proof of a prior conviction for a charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon; the prior conviction remained available to support enhanced sentencing as a recidivist, however. denied, 552 U.S. 833, 128 S. Ct. 60, 169 L. Ed. 16-11-131(c) mandating the granting of a pardon. Felony convictions include: any person who is on felony first Web10.15 (a) Possession Of [A Firearm] [An Electric Weapon or Device] [Ammunition] [Or] [Carrying a Concealed Weapon] by a Person Under the Age of 24 Who Has Been Found Delinquent of an Offense that would be a Felony if Committed by an Adult 790.23 (1) (b) or (1) (d), Fla. Stat. 3d Art. In the defendant's murder trial, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to specially demur to the counts in the defendant's indictment charging possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and felony murder predicated on that crime because neither count specified the felony of which the defendant was previously convicted; although it was required that the state prove a felony, it was not required that the felony be listed in the indictment. Adoption, Rejection, and Use of "Receipt of Benefits" Test Under 11 U.S.C.A. 6. Starling v. State, 285 Ga. App. 492, 379 S.E.2d 199, cert. Sign up for our free summaries and get the latest delivered directly to you. Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 434 S.E.2d 479 (1993). You already receive all suggested Justia Opinion Summary Newsletters. Jones v. State, 282 Ga. 306, 647 S.E.2d 576 (2007). 481, 657 S.E.2d 533 (2008), cert. 787, 608 S.E.2d 230 (2004), cert. Thomas v. State, 305 Ga. App. You can explore additional available newsletters here. (a) As used in this Code section, the term: (1) "Felony" means any offense Ballard v. State, 268 Ga. App. Landers v. State, 250 Ga. 501, 299 S.E.2d 707 (1983). A federal jury found a Springfield man guilty last week for knowingly possessing a firearm as a convicted felon after a two-day trial at After the defendant was found guilty of rape and aggravated assault, a separate guilt/innocence trial was held on the firearm possession charge, wherein the state introduced into evidence, without objection, a certified copy of the defendant's guilty plea and sentence for the crime of voluntary manslaughter, which testimony and documentary evidence from the combined proceedings sufficiently established that the defendant was guilty of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. 16-11-131(b).
18 U.S. Code 3665 - Firearms possessed by convicted VIII). Coursey v. State, 196 Ga. App. Web- Possession of a firearm by a convicted felon does not merge with act of shooting the firearm; therefore, a jury may find a convicted felon guilty of felony murder by treating the The arrest was made without a warrant or probable cause. 1. State v. Langlands, 276 Ga. 721, 583 S.E.2d 18 (2003). Bryant v. State, 169 Ga. App. 324, 316 S.E.2d 791, rev'd on other grounds, 253 Ga. 429, 322 S.E.2d 228 (1984), overruled in part by Ross v. State, 279 Ga. 365, 614 S.E.2d 31 (2005). - Since the state offered as proof of defendant's previous felony conviction a certified copy of the 1974 burglary conviction of one Henry Levi Glass and defendant presented no evidence contradicting that defendant was the person named in the 1974 documents, it was held that concordance of name alone is some evidence of identity and that in the absence of any denial by defendant and no proof to the contrary, this concordance of name was sufficient to show that defendant and the individual previously convicted were the same person. Tanksley v. State, 281 Ga. App. Defendant was not convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under O.C.G.A. 16-11-129(b)(3). This charge can land you in prison for a long time. Jones v. State, 318 Ga. App. Att'y Gen. No. 487, 562 S.E.2d 712 (2002); Reece v. State, 257 Ga. App. Hinton v. State, 297 Ga. App. - Possession of an antique shotgun while a convicted felon was sufficient to sustain a conviction under O.C.G.A. Unlawful Possession of a Firearm by Convicted Felon in Collin County, Texas. 350, 651 S.E.2d 489 (2007). - Unit of prosecution under O.C.G.A. 178, 786 S.E.2d 558 (2016). Harvey v. State, 344 Ga. App. denied, No. Chapter 790. Johnson v. State, 203 Ga. App. 17-10-7. An order of restoration of civil rights granted by the State Board of Pardons and Paroles which expressly authorizes an individual to receive, possess, or transport a firearm satisfies the requirements of O.C.G.A.
Supreme Court limits new trials for felons in possession of firearm 2d 344 (2008), overruled on other grounds, No.
Springfield, Illinois, Man Convicted of Possession of Firearm by a Count of possession of firearm by convicted felon does not merge with related armed robbery charge. Scott v. State, 250 Ga. 195, 297 S.E.2d 18 (1982). 16-11-131, since the violation of that statute was an other crime not shown to be connected with the one on trial, served no useful or relevant purpose, placed the defendant's character in evidence, and was prejudicial to the defendant. denied, 192 Ga. App. 16-11-131 is a reasonable regulation authorized by the police power and thus is not violative of Ga. Const. (1) Felony means any offense punishable by imprisonment for a term of one year or more and includes conviction by a court-martial under the Uniform Code of Military 614, 340 S.E.2d 256 (1986). 324, 316 S.E.2d 791, rev'd on other grounds, 253 Ga. 429, 322 S.E.2d 228 (1984), overruled in part by Ross v. State, 279 Ga. 365, 614 S.E.2d 31 (2005). Because a defendant was a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, a felony under O.C.G.A. Brooks v. State, 285 Ga. 424, 677 S.E.2d 68 (2009). Defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon was supported by evidence that the defendant was present in the apartment above the defendant's mother's garage, had access to the garage at any time, and was present in the apartment almost every time probation officers visited, allowing the jury to find the defendant had access, power, and intention to exercise dominion or control over the firearm found in the apartment. Johnson v. State, 282 Ga. 235, 647 S.E.2d 48 (2007). 16-11-131 or in refusing to charge sudden emergency, specific intent, or O.C.G.A. - Because the gravamen of the offense of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon is the general receive, possession, or transportation of firearms by convicted felons, rather than the specific quantity of firearms received, possessed, or transported, O.C.G.A. 370, 358 S.E.2d 912 (1987). As used in this Code section, the term "forcible felony" means any felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any person and further includes, without limitation, murder; murder in the second degree; burglary in any degree; robbery; armed robbery; home invasion in any degree; kidnapping; hijacking of an aircraft or hijacking a motor vehicle in the first degree; aggravated stalking; rape; aggravated child molestation; aggravated sexual battery; arson in the first degree; the manufacturing, transporting, distribution, or possession of explosives with intent to kill, injure, or intimidate individuals or destroy a public building; terroristic threats; or acts of treason or insurrection.
Texas 16-11-131 cannot also be used to punish a defendant as a repeat offender under O.C.G.A. The evidence authorized the trier of fact to conclude that the defendant used one firearm to shoot the victim and possessed another firearm in the defendant's bedroom. Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon based on the gun being found in close physical proximity to the defendant and that the defendant had in a pocket the exact number of the proper caliber bullets to completely reload the gun; although others had access to the car before the defendant took possession of the car, the evidence authorized the conclusion that the car had been visually inspected at a point close in time to when the defendant had sole access. Willie Antonio Bass, 35, of Augusta, is charged with Conspiracy to Possess with Intent to Distribute and To Distribute 500 Grams or More of Cocaine and Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon. - Defendant was not entitled to a new jury on a trial of a possession of a firearm by a convicted felon charge as, generally, all charges arising out of the same conduct had to be tried in a single prosecution; although there were limited exceptions to the rule allowing, under proper circumstances, the bifurcation of a possession of a firearm by a convicted felon charge, the defendant was not entitled to a separate trial before a new jury on that charge. 608, 845 S.E.2d 345 (2020); Marshall v. State, Ga. , S.E.2d (Sept. 8, 2020). In a prosecution for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, trial of the charges together was not required since defendant made no motion to sever and, in view of the limiting instructions given and the weight of the testimony of the victim and a corroborating witness, proof of a prior conviction did not place defendant's character in issue to such an extent as to affect the verdict on the armed robbery and firearm charges. - Defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon was reversed because the defendant established ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel's failure to object to the witness's testimony that improperly bolstered the investigator's testimony and credibility. denied, No. 16-11-131(b) if the felon carries a firearm. Evidence supported defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon as defendant's possession of the victim's handgun and shotgun on the night of the crimes was shown by the victim's direct testimony, rather than by circumstantial evidence, since: (1) the victim testified that two men forced their way into the victim's house, hit the victim in the head with a blunt object, recovered a .380 caliber handgun and a 20-gauge single-barrel shotgun, forced the victim to give them thousands of dollars the victim had hidden in the attic, and then fled; (2) during a consensual search, the police found a .380 caliber handgun hidden in the defendant's bedroom that was identified as the victim's by the victim and that bore the same serial number as the victim's gun; and (3) the victim identified defendant in a photo array and at trial; thus, the evidence authorized the jury to find that the defendant was in actual possession of the handgun and that defendant continued to be in at least constructive possession of the handgun when the handgun was found in defendant's bedroom. 565, 677 S.E.2d 752 (2009). 513, 621 S.E.2d 523 (2005). Adkins v. State, 164 Ga. App. Convictions of murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon were supported by sufficient evidence showing that while the victim was in the process of buying drugs from a third party, the defendant approached the driver's side of the victim's car, demanded the victim's money, and shot the victim several times, killing the victim and injuring a passenger in the car; the seller of the drugs testified that the seller had observed the defendant carrying a gun, and both the codefendant and another witness identified the defendant as the shooter. Despite the defendant's contrary contentions, evidence seized via the execution of a valid search warrant, specifically a substantial amount of methamphetamine, a set of scales in a case marked "dope kit inside," a .38 revolver, common tools of the drug trade, written instructions for making pure ephedrine, a loose bag of vitamin B-12 commonly used to dilute methamphetamine, over $2,000 in cash, and evidence that the defendant installed a video surveillance system to monitor the front door and driveway, both a trafficking in methamphetamine and possession of a weapon by a convicted felon conviction were supported by sufficient evidence. 448, 352 S.E.2d 642 (1987). It follows that the unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon or felony first-offender probationer will preclude the felon or - Because defendant's three prior felony convictions, and a subsequent conviction of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon as a result of one or more of those felonies, remained separate felonies that could be used to impose a recidivist punishment for the commission of yet another felony, and defendant did not seek to collaterally attack any of those convictions, the recidivists sentences imposed under O.C.G.A. Green v. State, 302 Ga. App. Certified copies of a defendant's out-of-state judgment of conviction, associated complaint, and plea hearing transcript were properly admitted into evidence to show that the defendant was a convicted felon for purposes of O.C.G.A. 17-10-7, when the state had already used that conviction in support of the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon because the defendant failed to object at sentencing to the exhibit containing the conviction. Section 925" was substituted for "18 U.S.C.
Brooks v. State Glass v. State, 181 Ga. App. Because Georgia abolished the inconsistent verdict rule, and despite the fact that the jury found that the defendant did not commit armed robbery, this did not preclude the trial judge from finding the defendant guilty of possessing a firearm while a convicted felon given evidence that: (1) the defendant's status as a convicted felon was not contested; and (2) the defendant was in constructive possession of the firearm used by another to commit the crimes charged and conspired to possess the firearm as a party to the crime.